Applying mobile agents technology to intrusion detection and response by CHEW WAI MENG
Chapter  
APPLYING MOBILE AGENTS TECHNOLOGY TO 










CHEW WAI MENG 













A THESIS SUBMITTED 
 
FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
SCHOOL OF COMPUTING 
 








I would like to send my gratitude to many people who have helped me as I worked 
on my thesis, and as I made my transition from Electronics Engineering to Computer 
Science. I would like to express my appreciation to Dr. Lam Kwok Yen for giving me 
the opportunity to embark on this area of research. Many thanks also go to A/Prof. Chi 
Chi Hung for his valuable advice and encouragement through the most difficult phase of 
my project. This thesis is able to be completed because A/Prof. Chi has given me 
inspirational leadership and guidance throughout. 
I would like to thank my labmate, Mr. Li Tie Yan for numerous brainstorming and 
discussion sessions.  
I would also like to thank the examiners for taking their precious time to review my 
thesis.  
On the personal side, I am grateful to my wife and my mother for having faith in 













 Acknowledgments                                                                        I 
   
 List of Figures                                                                               IV
   
 Abstract                                                                                         V 
   
1 Introduction                                                                                  1 
1.1 Motivation………………………………………………………………… 1 
1.2 Analysis on Attacks……………………….…….…….......................……. 4 
1.2.1    External Attacks………………………………………………………… 4 
1.2.2    Internal Attacks…………………………………………………………. 5 
1.2.3    Denial of Service Attacks…………………….…………………………. 6 
1.2.4    Distributed Denial of Service Attacks...………………………………… 8 
1.2.5   DDoS: A look at the future...……………………………………………… 9 
1.3 Intrusion Detection System…..…………………………………………… 10
1.3.1    Centralized Intrusion Detection System………………………………… 11
1.3.2    Distributed Intrusion Detection System………………………………… 13
1.4 Contributions to the Research……………………………………………. 16
1.5 Thesis Organization……………………………………………………..... 17
   
2 Related Works                                                 18
2.1 Mobile Agent Techniques…..…………………………………………….. 18
2.2 MAIDS Approaches……………………………..……………………….. 19
2.3 IDS suffered from DDoS Attacks……..………………………………….. 21
2.3.1    Distributed Intrusion Detection System………………………………… 21
2.3.2    Existing solutions against DDoS Attacks………………………………. 24
2.4 Intrusion Detection System Evasion………………..……………………. 25
2.4.1    IDS Evasion at the Network Layer……………………………………… 25
2.4.2    IDS Evasion from DDoS Attacks………………………………………... 26
   
3 Intrusion Response using Mobile Agents Technology              29
3.1 The Limitations on current design….…………………………………….. 29
3.2 Background concerning our model……………………………………….. 30
3.3 Description of Security Hosts and Placement within a domain…………... 32
3.3.1    Agents Involved…………………………………………………………. 32
3.3.2    Identifying Attacks by Agents…………………………………………… 33
3.4 The Organization of Proxy Region……………………………………….. 34
3.5 Backing up mechanism….……………...………………………………… 36
3.5.1    In the Critical Region…………………………………………………… 36
3.5.2    In the Proxy Region……..………………………………………………. 36
II 
3.5.3    In the Leaf Region……………………………………………………..... 38
3.6 Backing up critical agents……………………………………………….... 38
3.7 Procedures of location update and update/downlink…………………….... 40
3.7.1    Location updates of leaf agents…………………………………………. 40
3.7.2   Location updates of proxy group G and G’……………………………... 40
3.7.3  Location updates of critical agents………………………………………. 41
3.8 Procedures of uplink………………………………………………………. 41
3.9 Procedures of downlink of command……………………………………... 43
3.10 Attack Analysis on our model…………………………………………….. 44
3.10.1    Attack on leaf region( leaf agents)……………………………………… 44
3.10.2    Attack on proxy region(proxy agents)………………………………….. 45
3.10.3    Attack on critical region(critical agents)……………………………….. 46
3.11 Proposed Implementations Techniques…..………………………………. 47
3.12 Provable Attack Resistant Properties in our model……………………….. 48
   
4 Protecting Mobile Agent System                                                51
4.1 Background of Mobile Agent System Security……………………..……. 51
4.1.1    Protection of Host Resource……………………………………………. 52
4.1.2    Protection of Agents……………………………………………………. 53
4.2 A Review of Volker and Mehrdad’s Scheme……………………………... 54
4.2.1    Volker and Mehrdad’s Mobile Agent Structure………………………… 54
4.2.2    Volker and Mehrdad’s Key Management & Access Control Strategy….. 56
4.2.3    The Drawbacks of Volker & Mehrdad’s Scheme……………………….. 58
4.3 Proposed RSA Key Assignment & Access Control Strategy…………….. 59
4.3.1    The Proposed Scheme…………………………………………………... 59
4.3.2    Implementation………………………………………………………….. 61
4.4 Dynamic Key Management……………………………………………….. 64
4.4.1    Adding an access file……………………………………………………. 64
4.4.2    Deleting an access file…………………………………………………... 65
4.4.3    Granting an access file……………..……….…………………………... 65
4.4.4    Removing an access file…………………….…………………………... 65
4.5 Security and Performance Analysis………………………………………. 66
4.5.1    Cryptanalysis against RSA security………....…………………………… 66
4.5.2    Preventing unauthorized hosts from accessing…………………………. 67
4.5.3    Performance Analysis…………………….…………………………….. 68
   
5 Conclusions                                                                                   70
5.1 Conclusions……………………………………………………………….. 70
5.2 Future Works……………………………………………………………… 71
   
6 References                                                                                    73
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
III 
 
List of Figures 
 
1-1      Denial of Service Attack Categories…………………………………………….7 
1-2 Centralized Intrusion Detection System………………………………………..12 
1-3 Distributed Intrusion Detection System………………………………………...14 
1-4 Hierarchical Distributed Intrusion Detection Architecture……………………..15 
3-1 The Enterprise network and domains……..……….…………………………...32 
3-2 The schematic of proxy agents group…………………………………………..35 
3-3 The backup of proxy agents…………………………………………………….37 
3-4 The protection scheme in the region……………………………………………39 
3-5 The data upload procedure……………………………………………………...41 
3-6 The commands download procedure…………………………………………...43 
4-1 Schematics of agent system using Java……..………………………………….51 
4-2 Volker and Mehrdad’s Mobile agent structure…..……………………………..55 
4-3 Volker and Mehrdad’s access control and key management strategy………….58 
4-4 Our proposed strategy…………………………………………………………..62 











As the capabilities of intrusion detection systems (IDSs) advance, attackers may disable 
organizations’ IDSs before attempting to penetrate more valuable targets. To counter 
this threat, we present an IDS architecture that is resistant to flooding denial of service 
(DoS) attacks. The architecture frustrates attackers by making IDS components invisible 
to attackers’ normal means of “seeing” in a network. Upon a successful attack, the 
architecture allows IDS components to relocate from attacked hosts to operational hosts 
thereby mitigating the attack. These capabilities are obtained by using mobile agent 
technology, utilizing network topology features, and by restricting the communication 


















Over the last several decades, our society has rapidly become very dependent on 
computer technology. We have taken the controls for our whole civilization and loaded 
them onto digital machines. Our systems are responsible for storing sensitive medical 
information, guiding aircraft around the world, conducting nearly all financial 
transactions, planning food distribution and etc. A decade ago, the Internet was the 
refuge of researchers and academics. Now, as a major component of our population 
stares into computer screens and talks on mobile phones all day long for both business 
and personal uses, these technologies dominate our headlines and economy.  
 I am sure you have noticed that the underlying technologies behind computers and 
networks have many flaws. Sure, there are counterintuitive user interfaces and frequent 
computer crashes. Beyond these easily observed problems, there are some fundamental 
flaws in the design and implementation of the underlying operating systems, 
applications, and protocols. By undermining these flaws, an attacker can steal data, take 
over systems, or otherwise wreak havoc. 
The concept of security is traditionally connected to the need of protecting 
confidential data from unauthorized access, but nowadays security is frequently 
approached from different perspectives. With the growing use of Internet infrastructure 
for commercial applications, modern systems tend to rely heavily upon networking and  
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interoperation on public networks. As the Internet continues to grow, networked 
computer systems are more vulnerable to attack, and the number of attacks is growing 
exponentially.  
 In 1990, 252 incidents were reported to Computer Emergency Response Team 
(CERT). However, in just the first quarter of 2003, that number had grown to 42,586. In 
addition to the growth in the number of reported incidents, the number of systems 
involved per incident is growing – one recent incident involved several thousands of 
computer systems.12 Furthermore, it seems probable that most incidents are not detected 
or reported.  
 Why are there so many attacks occurring? Today, the world of hacking is extremely 
large and difficult to categorize. However, several studies reveal computer attacks have 
similarities with many other crimes: - perpetrators who have many motives, including 
greed, revenge, the thrill of the chase, and peer pressure.13 As the Internet continues to 
expand reaching billions of businesses and homes globally, online shopping is getting 
more popular.15 Electronic commerce not only offers new services for customers but 
new opportunities for significant financial reward to intruders. It would seem likely that 
the problem will continue to worsen. Therefore, there is a need to find new security 
solutions and services.  
 In most cases, people that call themselves hackers create security breaches. In the 
early days of computer hacking, most of the hackers were hacking for self-projection. 
Hackers went professionals. Nowadays, intrusion is no longer the concern of computer 
intellectuals but instead has become the latest opportunity for criminal profit.29 Many 
organizations have increasingly implemented various security systems such as firewall, 
IP traceback40, digital certificates, VPNs (Virtual Private Network) and intrusion 
detection to combat system violations and security breaches. Perhaps the most 
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promising among these is the use of Intrusion Detection System (IDS), IDS is widely 
deployed as a defense system because it can detect some set of intrusions and execute 
some predetermined action when an intrusion is detected.4  
Today, intrusion detection encompasses the capabilities of event log analysis for 
insider threat detection, network traffic analysis, security configuration management and 
file integrity checking. There are several types of IDSs technologies: - misuse detection 
approach, anomaly detection approach, network detection mechanism, packet content 
signatures and etc. Another common categorization is between centralized system and 
distributed system. When an intruder launches an attack and breaks into a system, he or 
she will first be blocked by firewall using unauthorized access control mechanisms. 
However, there is always some security loophole that enables the attackers to bypass it 
and this is the time when IDSs play the important role to detect intrusions as soon as 
possible and alert the system administrators.  
So far most research has been focused on developing the methods, improving 
efficiency and reducing the number of false positives (false alarms). Most of the 
existing IDSs have used central data analysis engines24 that are arranged in a 
hierarchical structure, where the event information usually flow up to IDSs central 
analyzer and the actions are then relayed to the IDSs sensors. The monolithic 
architecture contains a number of problems that limit their configuration capacity, 
scalability of efficiency.20,21 There has been concern over failure tolerance, as a 
monolithic system presents itself as a single point of failure and attack. 
Due to the extensive use of IDSs, it has become a primary target for attackers. Web 
site operators are frustrated by the apparent inability of Internet service providers and 
Web host providers to quickly filter out denial of service (DoS) attack traffic when it 
pours into their routers and servers. Till now there is no silver bullet for DoS attack.  
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1.2 Analysis on Attacks 
 
Threats from outside often are serious, of course. It would be a great mistake to 
underrate them or to write them off as some kind of media plot. It could be an even 
greater mistake, though, to let external threats distract you from the much greater 
vulnerability you face from inside your own organization. Below are two types of 
attacks:- 
 
1.2.1 External Attacks 
 
IP spoofing attacks: This is where the hacker steals an authorized IP address i.e. 
typically determining the IP address of a computer and waiting until there is no one 
using that computer, and then using the unused IP address. Spoofing is helpful for 
attackers who don’t want to have their actions traced back, because the packets will 
appear to be coming from the system whose address the attacker is using. Additionally, 
IP address spoofing helps attackers undermine various applications, particularly those 
that dangerously rely only on IP addresses for authentication or filtering. 
Packet sniffing: This is a common attack technique that gathers information from 
the local LAN, which could include userIDs, passwords, sensitive files or email. Passive 
sniffers gather traffic from the LAN without trying to manipulate the flow of data on the 
network. Active sniffing involves injecting traffic into the network to redirect packets to 
the sniffing machine.    
Sequence number prediction attacks: Initially, in a TCP/IP connection, the two 
computers exchange a start-up packet which contains sequence numbers. These 
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numbers are based on computer’s system clock and then run in a predictable manner, 
which can be determined by the hacker. 
 
1.2.2 Internal Attacks 
 
Password attacks: Passwords are the most commonly used computer security tool 
in the world today. In many organizations, the lowly password often protects some of 
the most sensitive secrets. Unfortunately, with this central role in security, easily 
guessed passwords are often the weakest link in the security of our systems. A single 
weak password for one user on one account could give an attacker a toehold on a system. 
There are numerous freely available tools which can automatically guess passwords at 
extremely high rates, looking for weak password to enter a system.   
Session hi-jacking attacks: This attack is based on a marriage of sniffing and 
spoofing. When a user has an established interactive login session with a machine using 
telnet rlogin, FTP, and so on, an attacker can use a session hijacking tool to steal the 
session from the user. When most hijack victims notice that their login sessions 
disappear, they often just assume it is network trouble. The users will likely just try to 
login again, unaware that their session was not dropped; it was stolen. 
Shared library attacks: Many systems have an area of shared library files. These 
are called by applications when they are required (for input/output, networking, graphics 
and so on). A hacker may replace standard libraries for ones that have been tampered 
with, which allows the hacker to access system files and to change file privileges. A 
hacker might tamper with dynamic libraries. This would allow the hacker to possibly do 
damage to the local computer, send all communications to a remote computer, or even 
view everything that is viewed on the screen.  
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   Technological vulnerability attacks: This normally involves attacking some part 
of the system (typically the operating system) which allows a hacker to access to the 
system. A typical one is for the user to gain access to a system and then run a program 
which reboots the system or slows it down by running a processor intensive program.  
 
1.2.3 Denial of Service Attacks 
 
  As we have seen in the previous section, some attackers want to gain access to the 
systems, and use a variety of creative techniques to achieve this goal. Whilst other 
attackers are not looking to gain access; they want to prevent access by legitimate users 
or stop critical system processes. To accomplish this objective, they will utilize a variety 
of attack techniques to deny service. In the security community, such denial-of-service 
attacks are frequently referred to as “DoS” attacks.  
Nowadays, many companies rely heavily on computer controlled systems, from 
environment control to factory robotics and automated warehouses. The disruption of 
these systems can shut down an entire business or be life threatening in the area of 
medical systems. A company that relies on electronic transactions for its livelihood 
could suffer serious financial damage if its systems are taken off line for even a short 
duration. There are incidents where an e-commerce company’s competitor launched a 
DoS attack against the company’s Web site, hoping that customers would abandon the 
target’s non-responsive servers and take their business to the attacker’s Web site.35,28 
According to [45], the total losses of US$123.7 million from information security 




Denial of Service (DoS) attacks is the most common and visible of all losses. While 
they often aren’t technically elegant, DoS attacks can severely impact an organization, 
making defenses quite important. As shown in Figure 1-1, DoS attacks generally fall 
into two categories: stopping a service and resource exhaustion. Each of these categories 
of attack can be launched locally or across the network.  
 
         STOPPING SERVICES             EXHAUSTING RESOURCES 
LOCALLY • Process killing 
• System reconfiguring 
• Process crashing 
• Forking processes to fill 
the process table 





• Malformed packet attacks 
(e.g Land, Teardrop, etc.) 
• Packet floods (e.g SYN 
Flood, Smurf, and 
Distributed DoS) 
 
Figure 1-1: Denial of Service attack categories 
 
 Stopping services locally prevents users from accessing them. An attacker could 
kill a process that provides the service, reconfigure the system to not offer the service, 
or even cause the service to crash. A logic bomb is a particularly nasty method for 
launching a local DoS attack. Another DoS technique is to locally exhaust resources. 
Attacks in this realm include filling up the process table, consuming the entire file 
system, or exhausting outgoing communications links.  
An attacker could launch a DoS attack by remotely stopping services. A common 
technique for accomplishing this is to send a malformed packet that exploits a bug in the 
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target operating systems or application, causing it to crash. The final category of DoS 
attacks is the most popular: remotely exhausting resources. In this type of attack, the 
adversary tries to suck up all available network capacity using a flood of packets. 
Several most popular techniques for launching a packet flood include SYN floods, 
Smurf attacks.  
  
1.2.4 Distributed Denial of Service Attacks 
 
A simple SYN flood allows an attacker to generate traffic from one machine. In a 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack there are no inherent limitations in the 
number of machines that can be used to launch the attack and how much bandwidth the 
attacker can consume. DDoS represents a new and nasty turn in the evolution of DoS 
attacks, by allowing an attacker to coordinate the activities of an arbitrarily large 
number of hosts.19  
To conduct a DDoS flood, the attacker will first take over a large number of victim 
machines, often referred to as ‘zombies’. Potential zombie systems are located 
anywhere on the Internet and have a variety of simple vulnerabilities that the attacker 
can quickly exploit to take over the system. The attacker will scan large swaths of the 
Internet looking for vulnerable machines, exploit them, and install the zombie software 
on the systems. Most machines where zombies are installed are taken over using buffer 
overflow attack. Attackers will establish groups of hundreds, thousands, or even tens of 
thousands of zombies.  
The attacker uses one or more client machines to tell all of the zombies to 
simultaneously execute a command, usually to conduct a DoS attack against the target. 
All zombies dutifully respond, flooding the victim in a bloodbath of packets. The client 
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communicates with the zombies, but the attacker usually accesses the client from a 
separate system. This technique makes it more difficult for investigators to find the 
attacker. After finding zombies and locating client programs, the investigators still do 
not have the attacker, who is sitting at another machine, perhaps halfway around the 
world. The most popular DDoS tools, is the Tribe Flood Network 2000 (TFN2K), 
written by Mixter.  
 
1.2.5 DDoS: A look at the future 
 
DDoS pose an immense threat to the Internet; attackers constantly modify their 
tools to bypass the defense mechanisms. The move from a single or handful of 
machines launching a SYN flood against a victim to a coordinated attack from hundreds 
or thousands of systems represents a significant step in the evolution of attacks. This 
evolution and the future of DDoS tools is highlighted by Mixter,27 the developer of 
TFN2K. 
Currently, a great deal of work is being done in the computer underground to 
extend the concept of distributed attacks beyond TFN2K. One of those is the “stream” 
attack (discovered by Tim Yardley). Stream attack sends TCP packets with either ACK 
or both SYN and ACK flags set. Because they are not part of a connection, they will 
“confuse” a target machine and take some time to be processed by the operating system. 
If this attack is used in a distributed way, the attacker can overload machines with less 
hosts. It is very trivial to implement this feature. Another improvement is multicasting 
IP addresses. As multicast addresses are routed (forwarded) specifically by routers, they 
can multiply one packet into several ones. The concept would be to send out packets 
with a multicast (224.x.x.x) source. A target could send an error message back to 
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multicast destinations, and multiply the bandwidth. Last but not least, attackers 
purposefully send special strings in the flood traffic, strings that Intrusion Detection 
Systems could falsely interpret as break-in attempts, the impact would be false alarms 
and the affected Intrusion Detection Systems could get overloaded or crashed. 
 
1.3 Intrusion Detection System  
 
An intrusion can be defined as any set of actions that attempt to compromise the 
integrity, confidentiality or availability of resource.32 Intrusions are hard to catch 
because there are so many ways in which they may take place. In today’s software 
development environment, the programming languages and operating system introduce 
a number of security flaws. These security flaws are difficult to detect and intruders are 
making use of these weaknesses to bypass existing security mechanisms.  
 In 1980, Anderson introduced the concept and terminology of intrusion detection. It 
has provided the early theoretical foundations for IDS. In his paper18, he defined several 
terms and classified six categories of intrusive activities: - attempted break-ins, 
masquerade attacks, penetrations of security control system, leakage and denial of 
service attacks. In the beginning almost all intrusion detection systems were host based. 
Whilst in 1987, Denning extended Anderson’s work through the introduction of generic 
detection model.11 Besides focusing on generic model, she has provided a broad 
framework for future intrusion detection research. IDS are typically categorized into 
misuse detection approach and anomaly detection approach. Another common 
categorization is between network based approach and host based approach. In host 
based approach, we can also categorize them between centralized systems and 
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distributed systems. Distributed intrusion detection systems have a number of 
advantages over their centralized counterparts such as scalability, graceful degradation 
of service and subversion resistance. In the following, we will comment on the 
advantages and disadvantages of centralized and distributed intrusion detection systems.  
 
1.3.1 Centralized Intrusion Detection System 
 
A centralized intrusion detection system is one where the analysis of the data is 
performed in a fixed number of locations, independent of how many hosts are being 
monitored. The event information from the sensors usually flows up whilst command 
and controls usually flow down. Figure 1-2, shows an event record of this type of 
architecture. The physical location of the event generators will be fixed since they 
monitor stationary resources. When all information is processed at a single location, the 
system is not scalable. The processing capacity of the analyzer unit limits the monitored 
network size and distributed data collection can lead to excessive data traffic over the 
network. Last but not least, a central analyzer is a single point of failure and a single 
target for an attack. If an attacker can disrupt such a failure point, a large portion of the 
network’s IDS becomes inoperable. Current available intrusion detection system 




























Figure 1-2: Centralized Intrusion Detection System 
 
Typical events occurring in a centralized system (shown in Figure 1-2) are:-  
1. An event record is created. This occurs when an action takes place, such as a 
file open or word processor. The record is written into a file that is usually 
protected by the operating system trusted computing base. 
2. The target agents submit the file to the command console. This happens at 
predetermined time intervals over a secure communications link. 
3. The detection engine, configured to match patterns of misuse, processes the file. 
Data records are parsed in their raw, or original format. 
4. A log is created that acts as a data archive for all the raw data used in a 
prosecution. 
5. When a suspicious activity occurred, an alert is generated. When a predefined 
pattern is observed, such as access to a mission critical file, an alert is 
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forwarded to a number of different subsystems for notification, response and   
storage. 
6. The security officer is notified. This can be done through audible or visual 
methods; pager, email, SNMP.  
7. A response is generated. The response subsystem matches alerts to predefined 
responses or can take direction from the security officer to execute a response. 
Responses include actions as reconfiguring the system, shutting down a target 
etc. 
8. The alert is stored. The storage is usually a relational database. Some systems 
store statistical data as well as alerts. 
9. The raw data is moved to raw data archive. This archive is rolled over 
periodically to reduce the amount of disk space used. 
10. Reports are generated.  
11. Data forensic is used to look for long term trends. The behaviour is analyzed 
using both the stored data in the database and the raw event log archive, where 
data from in-band and out-of-band sources may be correlated to detect a wide 
range of misuse. 
 
1.3.2 Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
 
A distributed intrusion detection system is one where the analysis of the data is 
performed in a number of locations proportional to the number of hosts that are being 






















Figure 1-3: Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
 
1. An event record is created. 
2. The file is read in real-time and processed through a target resident detection 
engine. The range of detection is limited to a single target in this architecture. 
3. The security officer is notified. Some system notify directly from target whilst 
others notify from the central console. 
4. A response is generated. The response may be generated from the target or 
console depending on the architecture. 
5. An alert is generated and sent to a central console. 
6. The alert is stored. Statistical behavioral data outside alert data are not usually 
available in this architecture. 
7. Data forensics is used to look for long-term trends. 




The classic solution to combat the shortcomings of central analyzer is the 
introduction of several hierarchical layers and redundant components. One of the 
earliest distributed intrusion detection system (DIDS) is a joint project between UC 
Davis, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and US Air Force.39 Most DIDS such 
as Cisco Netranger8 are using hierarchical structure as shown in Figure 1-4. The 
hierarchical architecture involves four levels, the bottom layer is the IDS hosts that 
contain either host based or network based IDS sensors. At the lower layer, the IDS 
controllers are performing data reduction or aggregation. This is the advantage of 
subversion resistance, with the controllers cross checking each other. At the immediate 
layer, there are analysis controllers which receive the data transferred from lower layer 
and analyze them. They also communicate with the higher layer to report their analysis 
results. In higher layer, the decision making controllers will process the results and 
generate a report for the system administrator. The administrator can then manually 

















1.4 Contributions to the Research  
 
Many people have benefited from deploying automated IDSs within an 
organization’s security architecture. Oddly enough, one of the most obvious benefits of 
deploying IDSs is also one of the current main drawbacks. The amount of data collected 
and notifications generated by current IDSs may quickly overwhelm most 
organization’s security operations, especially if the systems are deployed without any 
customization based on the specific requirements of the monitored environment. With 
the new DDoS features being developed, IDSs may become a primary target for 
attackers. In order to prevent such threat, I have proposed an architecture that makes use 
of mobile agent technology that can evade further damage caused by flooding DoS 
attacks. I have published this idea in the Proceedings of IEEE IPDPS 2002.42  
Agents, intelligent agents and agent based systems have attracted considerable 
interest from many fields of computer science. Agent technology has been academically 
applied in a variety of fields, particularly in artificial intelligence, distributed systems, 
software engineering and electronic commerce. In this proposed model, I have adopted 
the use of mobile agents and a combination of techniques. Firstly, critical IDS 
components are made adaptive to flooding DoS attacks in that they can be automatically 
relocate and backup in the event of an attack. Secondly, we make use of both static and 
mobile agents as building blocks. Various agents perform tasks in control, detection, 
and policy. Proxy agent group is introduced to frustrate the attackers. Suspected packets 
are also blocked before they can penetrate valuable targets in IDS. This IDSs model is 
not primarily a mobile agent model but it does make extensive use of mobile agent 
technology. This technology enables load balancing and provides backup capability.  
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Many people avoid mobile agent technologies because they believe them to be 
insecure. In order to prevent sensitive data from unauthorized hosts accessing and being 
tampered by malicious agents, we proposed an efficient key assignment scheme based 
on RSA to enhance the performance of Volker and Mehradad’s scheme.36 As mobile 
technology is implemented as a solution to protect IDS architecture; they are vulnerable 
to attacks and tampering. In order to prevent these attacks, mobile agents must follow 
some proper security policies or techniques such as access control, authenticating, 
credentials, code verification.37 All agents arriving at the hosts are authenticated by their 
unique identification. This authentication scheme is used all over this architecture. It can 
be used to check if the agents stay in their proper regions. 
 
1.5 Thesis Organization 
 
Chapter 2 of this thesis surveys some related works on the weakness of current 
intrusion detection system. We will highlight the Distributed Denial of Service attack 
that will disable IDS architecture and discuss how mobile agent technology can be the 
solution to this problem.  
 Next, Chapter 3 presents our approach for protecting IDS based on mobile agent 
technology. In this chapter, we will examine how the system prevents penetration 
attacks from disabling IDSs.  
Chapter 4 provides a more detailed consideration of protecting mobile agents using 
efficient authentication scheme.  
 Finally, Chapter 5 discusses what conclusions can be drawn from the work, the 





2.1 Mobile Agent Techniques 
 
Mobile agents offer several potential advantages when used in IDSs that may 
overcome limitations that exist in IDSs that only employ static, centralized components. 
What is mobile agent? A software agent is a piece of code that can run on host, perform 
transparent migration to another host, and resume its running state. The agent comprises 
of code and state information needed to carry out some computation and requires an 
agent platform to provide the computational environment in which it operates. Agents 
may be static or mobile. Stationary agents remain resident at a single platform, whilst 
mobile agents are capable of moving from one platform to another and interact with 
each other. In order to accomplish their task, mobile agents can also gather data and use 
services present on visited hosts. The mobile agent characteristics could be addressed as 
follows: - 
• the rapidity of execution due to the small quantity of code the mobile agents 
represent. This is particularly desirable to respond to the attack as soon as 
possible. 
• reducing network load. Instead of sending huge amounts of data to the data 
processing unit, it moves the processing algorithm (i.e agent) to the data.  
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• the ability to adjust their execution code depending on the characteristics of the 
machine they visit. This factor is also important since it enables the mobile 
agents to adjust the defense parameters to better protect the system. 
• the mobility which is the main propriety. As mobile agents can travel across the 
network they can filter the relevant information from different machines. They 
have the ability to correlate all this information and adapt the answer. For 
instance it could be helpful if one attack is coming from several sources or if one 
attack reaches several destinations. They can also use these migration abilities in 
order to limit the possibilities of interaction between the agents themselves and a 
potential offensive piece of code.  
It is obvious that applying mobile agent technology into intrusion detection system will 
be more encouraging if we can combine the full intrusion detection capabilities with the 
mobility property of agents. This combination may need to separate the IDS into many 
small pieces of functional units--- the IDS components. These components are wrapped 
into mobile agents to make them the IDS agents. Therefore, the combined system is 
actually built on the underlying mobile agent paradigm. In the research area, one of the 
successful IDSs of using agents--- AAFID, is a very typical approach of using 
autonomous agents for intrusion detection. 
 
2.2 MAIDS Approaches 
 
In the literature, many researchers have conducted the agent based intrusion 
detection system solving different problems. Although some of their systems have been 
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studied for years, no ideal result is published and no completed project is applied well 
into practical system. IDSs are still in their infancy. They are: 
1), CERIAS at Purdue University developed a distributed IDS called 
Autonomous Agents For Intrusion Detection.2 AAFID was the first architecture of using 
autonomous agents for intrusion detection. The system is based on independent entities 
called autonomous agents for performing distributed data collection and analysis. The 
agents report to Transceivers on a per-host basis and the transceivers further report to 
the higher level Monitors that have control and data processing role. Their hierarchical 
architecture allows data to be collected from multiple sources, thus being able to 
combine the best characteristics of traditional host based and network based IDSs. The 
modular characteristics of the architecture allow it to be easily extended, configured and 
modified.  
2), Helmer et. al at Iowa State University developed a system of using mobile 
agent technologies and collaborative information to implement a prototype IDS: 
“intelligent agents for intrusion detection”.17 This system is a layered system of using 
data mining techniques for detecting intrusions. The agents at different layers perform 
different parts of the data mining procedure such as data cleaning agents, data 
classifying agents and data mining agents. This system was more focused on 
implementing the agent's internal intelligence than on using the agent's mobility feature. 
3), JAM project conducted at Columbia University44 was a distributed data 
mining approach. The system has two key technologies: local fraud detection agents that 
learn how to detect fraud and provide intrusion detection services within a single 
corporate information system; and a secure, integrated meta-learning system that 
combines the collective knowledge acquired by individual local agents. Agents were 
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used here mainly for sharing knowledge (meta-learning) from different remote 
classifiers. 
4), Other approaches include Intrusion Detection Agent (IDA) system22 in Japan 
and Intrusion Detection System based on Mobile Agent (IDSMA)23 in Brazil. The IDA 
system used two kinds of agents, the information gathering agents and tracing agents, 
for collecting information and tracing intruders in a local area network. While IDA may 
be suitable for LAN, the system design must be reconsidered to fit large-scale network. 
IDSMA presents a hierarchical architecture for using mobile agent in IDS. It uses a 
large number of small mobile agents to perform all the tasks of monitoring, decision-
making, notification and reaction to attempted intrusions. The authors claimed a clear 
layered model as the framework and implemented part of the functions. However, we 
can only evaluate the system given more detailed design information. 
From the above survey, we see that the usage of mobile agent technology does 
help to build a better hierarchical IDS with many precious properties like: continuous 
autonomous running, fault tolerance, scalable and adaptable, they still suffer from a 
major problem that an un-secure mobile agent platform may even shutdown the IDS. 
Specially, we introduce a DDoS attack against MAIDS in the following section. 
 
2.3 IDS suffered from DDoS Attacks 
 
2.3.1 Distributed Intrusion Detection System 
 
The powerful Distributed DoS attack tools are like Tribe Flood Network 2000 
(TFN2K) and Stacheldraht.5 These attacks typically exhaust link bandwidth, router 
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processing capacity, to achieve the objective of breaking network connectivity of the 
victims. One of the most interesting features of TFN2K involves the communication 
between client and zombies. In order to prevent other attackers or the zombie machine’s 
administrator from accessing the zombie, the client must authenticate to the zombies 
using an encrypted password. Then all the packets from the client to the zombies are 
sent using an ICMP Echo Reply packet. TFN2K communicates using a ping response, 
without ever sending a ping. First, ICMP Echo Replies are allowed into many networks, 
because the network administrator configures routers and firewalls to allow inside users 
to ping the outside world. Their ping responses have to get back in, so ICMP Echo 
Reply packets are allowed. Another reason for using ICMP is to make the connection 
more stealthy. There is no port number associated with ICMP; the system just listens for 
ICMP packets and passes them to the TFN2K application. Therefore, if the 
administrator runs Nmap to conduct a port scan of the zombie machine or runs the 
netstat –na command locally to get a list of open ports, no new ports will be listed as 
open for TFN2k, because it uses ICMP.  
TFN2K communication also supports a variety of stealth mechanisms. First, the 
source address of all traffic from the client to the zombies can be spoofed. Further, the 
zombies themselves spoof the traffic sent to the victim machines. The servers can even 
send out decoy packets to other victims to help throw off an investigation. When an 
investigation into a DDoS attack occurs, the end victim has to trace the attack back, 
router by router, ISP by ISP, to one or more of the zombies. From that point, the attack 
must be traced back, again router by router, ISP by ISP, to the client. Even then, we 
have not yet found the attacker, who is connected to the client using Netcat, possibly 
forwarded along a Netcat relay network. In other words, finding the attacker with a truly 
robust TFN2K deployment is very difficult.    
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DDoS attack is particularly damaging. After gaining access to the target systems, 
most attackers want to ensure that other intruders will be kept off from the system. The 
more experienced attackers will harden the system, installing security patches and 
shutting down irrelevant services to prevent other attackers from gaining access to the 
system. Next, the attackers want to maintain that access. In order to keep access and 
control of the systems, attackers utilize techniques based on malicious code such as 
Trojan horses, backdoors, and RootKits.  
Netcat is one of the most popular backdoor tools in use today.1 Firstly, the attackers 
compile it with its “GAPING_SECURITY_HOLE” option, so that Netcat can be used 
to start running another program on the victim machine.  After loading the Netcat 
executable onto the victim machine, Netcat will listen on TCP port 12345. When the 
attacker connects to TCP port 12345 using Netcat as a client, the Netcat backdoor will 
execute a command shell. The attacker then has an interactive shell session across the 
network to execute any commands on the victim machine. The context of the shell 
session will be the same as the attacker when she or he executed the Netcat listener. A 
backdoor, ideally will continue to provide access for the attacker even as the system 
configuration changes, with users being added and deleted. Attackers understand that 
backdoor utilities must have names that will not attract any undue attention. A properly 
constructed backdoor will still be usable by the attacker to gain access even if the 
original entry point is closed by a system administrator.  
Upon determining the location of critical IDS components, the malicious code 
opens a channel for the attacker to launch a flooding DoS attack. Even if an 
organization became aware of the reconnaissance code, by the time a response is 
initiated, the attacker would have gained a view of the organization’s internal IDS 
topology. Upon discovery of IDS topology, the attacker would like to penetrate and 
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control the distributed IDS. However, critical IDS components are likely to be well 
maintained and difficult to penetrate but the malicious code can eventually increase the 
rate of attack. Without the critical aggregation, analysis and reporting capabilities, the 
IDS will not be able to effectively detect and respond to attacks.  
 
2.3.2 Existing solutions against DDoS Attacks 
 
The seriousness of the Distributed DoS problem and the increased frequency of 
DDoS attack have led to the advent of numerous defense mechanisms. However these 
solutions have some drawbacks. Most of the mechanism require certain features to 
achieve their peak performance, and will perform quite differently if deployed in an 
environment where these requirements are not met.  
Most zombies are deployed by attackers using standard exploits against unpatched 
systems; one must keep the systems patched and up to date. However, because some 
attackers may still break into the systems and install a zombie, another solution is the 
filtering mechanisms which filter out attack streams completely.25 Examples include 
dynamically deployed firewalls and also a commercial system TrafficMaster. As DDoS 
attack always involve spoofed packets, egress anti-spoof filters will be useful in 
protecting zombie running on one of the machines. These filters will drop all outgoing 
traffic from your network that does not have a source IP address found on your network. 
However, it runs the risk of accidentally denying service to legitimate traffic.  
There are other several countering solutions against DDoS attack, such as installing 
extremely fast computers, have adequate bandwidth, have redundant paths through 
multiple ISPs. Still, even with all these mentioned solutions that an organization can 
afford, a large enough grouping of zombies can easily overwhelm any network. In 
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reality most organizations simply cannot afford to buy bigger bandwidth to handle 
massive DDoS attack. 
 
2.4 Intrusion Detection System Evasion 
 
IDS evasion is a very active area of research in the computer underground right 
now. New tools and techniques are being devised to avoid IDS, and existing techniques 
are being added to older tools. 
 
2.4.1 IDS Evasion at the Network Layer 
 
IP offers the ability for the network devices to fragment packets to optimize the 
packet length for various transmission media. A large IP packet is broken down into a 
series of fragments, each with its own IP header. The fragments are sent one by one 
across the network, where they are reassembled by the destination host.  
When these fragments pass by network-based IDS, all of them must be captured, 
remembered, and analyzed by the IDS. A large number of disparate fragment streams, 
spread out over a long time, means that the IDS must have considerable long-term 
buffers to store all of this data. Therefore, IDS require a great deal of memory and 
processing power to gather and analyze fragments. Furthermore, to analyze the 
communication reflected in the fragments, the IDS must reassemble all of these packets 
in the same way that the target system does reassembly.  
Let’s explore an example of how an attacker may fragment packets to evade IDSs 
detection. The “tiny fragment” attack is designed to fool the IDS by creating an initial 
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fragment that is very small. The packet is sliced in the middle of the TCP header. The 
first fragment is so small, in fact, that it does not contain the TCP port number. Instead, 
the TCP port number follows in the second packet. Suppose the IDS is looking for 
traffic on a specific port, such as TCP port 23, to warn administrators when someone 
tries to telnet but because the IDS is looking for the port number to make filtering 
decisions, it may ignore the tiny initial fragment as it passes. After all, the first fragment 
does not have a port number in it. Also, the IDS may allow the second fragment without 
a concern. After all, it’s just part of the original packet associated with the first fragment. 
In this way, the attacker has managed to send in two packets that avoid detection by the 
IDS.     
 
2.4.2 IDS Evasion from DDoS Attacks 
 
A lot of previous works has focused on detecting DDoS attacks and mitigating their 
detrimental impact upon the victim.9 This approach does not eliminate the problem, nor 
does it deter potential attackers. Given the damage that can be inflicted through DDoS 
attack, the best defense against a massive DDoS attack involves rapid detection and the 
ability to response efficiently. Therefore, we need to employ IDS tools that can quickly 
alert you when a DDoS attack starts. 
 Our approach was inspired by some early works done by [7, 16, 17, 31, and 34]. 
These works includes implementing lightweight agents for intrusion detection, using 
mobile agents to counter DDoS attack and thwarting attackers by hiding critical IDS 
components. In [7], researchers have developed a framework named Sparta (which is an 
acronym for Security Policy Adaptation Reinforced Through Agents), which heavily 
relies on mobile agents. The goal of Sparta is to design a mobile agent based IDS that 
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identifies and improves potential shortcomings of other intrusion detection system 
designs. In the design, each host has at least a local event generator, storage component 
and the mobile agent platform installed. Agents can be seen as guards, which protect a 
network by moving from host to host and performing random sampling. Instead of 
monitoring each host at any time, agents only visit machines from time to time to 
conduct their examination.  
 In Peter Mell’s design,31 he proposed the use of mobile agent technologies to 
seamlessly relocate critical IDS components from attacked hosts to hosts that are still 
operational. Thus, the IDS components become invisible to an attacker’s normal means 
of seeing in a network, such as passive sniffing, active network monitoring, and host 
penetration and analysis. The IDS components become invisible by using assumptions 
about the network topology and by restricting the communication allowed between 
certain types of components. In the event that a critical component is attacked, then the 
component moves to an operational host. When it may appear impossible for an agent to 
move from an attacked host, we use mobile agent technology to enable a type of backup 
system for processes. Thus, the agents on attacked hosts can become disabled and 
mobile agents on other hosts will automatically pick up the disabled components’ duties.    
 Another challenging issue when building IDS using mobile agents is how to relate 
information from different sources. How can there be cooperation and communication 
between agents themselves? Helmer16 has suggested using lightweight agents to do 
event correlation. The proposed design includes: - (1) static data cleaning agents that 
obtain information from system logs, audit data, (2) low level agents that monitor and 
classify ongoing activities, (3) facets for the low level agents that add cooperation to the 
agents, (4) data mining agents that use machine learning to acquire predictive rules for 
intrusion detection from system logs. The agents themselves communicate directly only 
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to their related data gathering agents and mediators. This will allow agents to fuse 
related data in real time and take advantage of knowledge about the security status of 
related components in the system. 
 In the next chapter, we will further study the evasion solution of using mobile agent 
based architecture. We design the secure architecture for protecting the critical IDS 
components and through the backup and flow control mechanisms, the system will be 





















Intrusion Response Using Mobile Agents 
Technology 
 
3.1 The Limitations on current design 
 
In the last chapter, we pointed out the problems faced by centralized IDSs and how 
DDoS attack can freeze or shut them down. Therefore, we adopted Peter Mell’s design 
and improved on it. The essence of his approach is the implementation of proxy region 
with proxy agents. However, there are too many restrictions and assumptions that limit 
its usefulness in the real IDSs.  
Firstly, one of the inequitable assumptions made in Peter Mell’s design is that the 
network backbone including critical and proxy hosts is not penetrable. It could be true 
that the critical hosts are well configured and are not penetrable via network attacks. 
However, it is inappropriate to claim that proxy hosts are not penetrable. According to 
their definition in the design, all of the intermediate elements in the network are 
included into proxy region. According to Peter Mell’s assumptions, the IDSs’ 
applications are built such that an attacker can exploit no flaws in gaining unauthorized 
access. However, according to [33], the failure of the system is mainly due to the weak 
security in the modern complex software. 
Secondly, all of the child hosts are resided in the regions (usually contain hosts and 
servers used by an organization). These child hosts are not allowed to initiate 
connection to any other regions. If the network is only used for intrusion detection 
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approach, this assumption would be feasible. But most networks will be used for some 
sort of applications and therefore they must have communications between network 
elements.  
Last but not least, the ignored problem of their proposal lies in the central directory 
server problem. In Peter Mell’s design, mobile agent technology was being used to 
secure the IDS architecture. In the event when an attacker cannot locate the critical IDS 
hosts/agents, the next target will be on the mobile agent directory server. To solve the 
above mentioned problems, we have proposed the well-known and widely used RSA 
public key cryptosystem. The agent code is signed and can be authenticated before it is 
executed (to protect the platform). 
 
3.2 Background concerning our model 
 
To counter the threat of attackers finding and disabling IDS components, we have 
proposed a model using passive response system. It is an anticipated way to place the 
system on the defensive without disturbing too much of its operation. Instead of actively 
trying to stop an attacker’s actions, our proposed model attempts to hide IDS 
components and move them away from harm. Thus, our IDS components become 
invisible to an attacker’s means of seeing in a network: passive sniffing, active network 
monitoring, and host penetration. In the event that a critical component is attacked, then 
the component moves to an operational host. Whilst it may appear impossible for an 
agent to move from an attacked host, we use mobile agent technology to enable a type 
of backup system for processes.   
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Applying software agents to intrusion detection is not entirely new. One noteworthy 
DIDS is Autonomous Agents for Intrusion Detection (AAFID) developed by Purdue 
University. AAFID is in many ways a classical DIDS with agents used mainly as a 
means for structuring the intrusion detection collection component into a set of 
lightweight software components. In our proposed model, we have enhanced the 
performance of Peter Mell’s architecture, by making several changes. Firstly, we do not 
restrict the communication flow between different regions since they may need to 
cooperate with one another. Secondly, we didn’t include the proxy region (agent) into 
the backbone region since there are many proxy agents in operation and to make all 
impenetrable is impossible. A backbone is a set of network elements that are typically 
secure against penetration from attackers on the network: firewalls, routers, and 
switches. Backbones are also allowed to contain security devices that are secured 
against penetration from network attacks. Thirdly, we removed the central directory 
server with several region based servers at different layers. 
In Figure 3-1, we defined the network into several domains: Domain A, B and C. 
Every domain contains special security hosts that are mobile agent enabled. The security 
hosts consists of critical, proxy and leaf. These domains can communicate securely with 
IPv6 with IPsec protection.  IPsec stipulates a mandatory authentication protection for 
“IP Header” and an optional confidentiality protection for the endpoint-identity 
information which is in some “IP Header Fields”. As IPsec is offered at the IP layer, any 
higher-layer protocol such as TCP and UDP can take advantage of IPsec capabilities. 
By implementing IPsec protection, Domain A has created a “secure path” with Domain 


























Figure 3-1: The Enterprise network and domains 
 
3.3 Description of Security Hosts and 
Placement within a domain 
 
3.3.1 Agents Involved 
 
Critical region composes of the critical hosts that may include the important 
application server and also the critical IDSs hosts. Critical hosts are residing in this 
region and house the critical agents to perform intrusion detection aggregation, analysis 
and control. The critical agents are the most important to protect against attacks. Similar 
to many existing IDSs, if the packets are not from an authorized source, the critical host 
quietly drops the packets without sending any reply. This region can be any network 
topology but its network bandwidth must be wide enough to ensure the internal high-
speed communication. The communication between this region and proxy region must 
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be wide too. Therefore, the communication between these two regions cannot be easily 
flooded by attacks. The critical servers are also responsible for connecting to the proxy 
group coordinators. 
Proxy region is composed of all the intermediate layer hosts or networks elements. 
Proxy region also house the proxy agent responsible for receiving (incoming) packets 
from and sending (outgoing) packets to the leaf agents. Critical hosts are not allowed to 
directly communicate with the leaf region. Instead, critical and leaf region need to 
communicate through proxy region. The controller agent can be found inside this region. 
The controller agent is responsible for load balancing. When the host is overloaded, it 
will notify the leaf agent not to send any more packets of new sessions to it.   
Leaf region is usually the local area network (LAN) in the network. It comprises of 
working machines/servers used by organizations and IDS components such as the host 
IDS’s sensors. Gateway agent is an agent that resides in this region. It is responsible for 
grabbing packets from the external network and sending them to one of the controller 
agents in proxy region. The mobile agent that works in this region cannot move to 
another region. However, we didn’t restrict the communication between two leaf 
regions because they may be two cooperated departments of a company.  
 
3.3.2 Identifying Attacks by Agents 
 
When attack events occur, the agents must be able to discover the scenario as an 
intrusion. There are three possible ways to describe attacks. Firstly, it is to implicitly 
describe attacks by providing code that directly operates on data structures delivered by 
data gathering components. The code itself determines whether an intrusion has 
occurred by processing the input and calling appropriate response functions. 
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Another possible way that separates ID systems into components is the 
specification of scenarios in an application-specific scripting language. Usually, one is 
supported by predefined data types (e.g IP packets) or a rudimentary way of expressing 
timing constraints. 
The last approach is a special language which allows the security officer to define 
attack patterns which consist of a set of events that can be spatially and temporally 
related. The description of the attack is translated into rules and code, which can directly 
be processed by agents. This has the advantage of an intuitive description of the attack 
scenario.    
 
3.4 The Organization of Proxy Region 
 
As shown in Figure 3-2, cluster G is a multicast group and all the proxy agents are 
members of the cluster. Within the cluster, agent can share information of detection and 
intrusion. Each of the members in group G has a shadow in the mirror cluster G’. For 
example, A1 and A1’, A2 and A2’, C and C’ are all “buddy” agents. As the buddy agent 
group G’ is not a multicast group so that there is no group communication inside G’ 
(this is to permit only one to one communication). Agent C and C’ are their group 
coordinators respectively. The main objective of such a structure is that we want the 
proxy agents to be protected by their “buddy” agents. The structure can also help to 
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Figure 3-2: The schematic of proxy agents group 
 
 Note that A and A’ are the “buddy” agents, the same goes for C and C’. The buddy 
agent will be generated at the same time and distributed with a pair of effective access 
keys. We will discuss the cryptographic keys assigning in mobile agent environments in 
Chapter 4. If one agent is in danger, the other agent can backup its ruined “buddy” agent 
by the backup mechanism. The proxy region is divided into several different network 
segments. We have carefully arranged the proxy agents in different network segments. 
In the event of penetrated host, its agents cannot be used by the attacker as the sniffing 





3.5 Backing up mechanism 
 
In the event that an attacker eliminates an agent, the backup is very important for 
the protection of the agent system. It has to be resumed quickly and completely so that it 
would not disrupt IDSs detection and response. A simple voting scheme is used to 
decide which agents should be the successor. The backup agents maintain full or partial 
state information of the agent they are backing up. The resurrected agent will then be 
able to resume to its full or partial state of functionalities. Every agent will have one or 
more backup in the event of attacks. However, the tasks of backup mechanisms for 
agents in the three regions are different. 
 
3.5.1 In the Critical Region 
 
There are two backup agents for agents in critical region. When a critical agent is 
down, these two backup agents will negotiate a successor and this elected one will 
resume as the critical agent. It will then negotiate for its own backups. The backup 
agents can only stay inside the critical region. 
 
3.5.2 In the Proxy Region 
 
The backup mechanism for the proxy agents is a little more complex. In Figure 3-3, 
A and A’ are two “buddy” agents. B and B’ are the backups of A and A’ respectively. 
We let A keep contact with B’ and A’ keep contact with B for the reason that if A is 
ruined, A’ can help to resurrect A with B and vice versa. Agent A is not allowed to keep 
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contact with its backup B because if A is ruined, B will fail too. We designed this 
scheme because we can use the relationship of A and A’ (they are “buddy” agents and 
can coordinate with each other). Therefore, whenever one of the agents is under attack, 











Figure 3-3: The backup of proxy agents 
 
 At normal status, A’ will initiate connections to A on a fixed time interval. In one 
connection, they will exchange their locations and current status. In the event when A’ 
detects a wrong status in A, A’ will decide that A is being ruined and it will soon 
replace A with agent B. As A’ always keeps the latest location of B and frequently 
updates A’ current status to B. Furthermore, A’ will backup itself once and let the 
resurrected agent A keep contact with it. The original backup for A’, B’ will lose as A is 
ruined. B’ will disable itself if it cannot receive any responses from A for a specified 
period. The backup mechanism can only work with the help from their group 
coordinators C and C’ that provide their current locations to each other. Also the backup 
mechanism for C and C’ is almost the same, but it needs help form the critical server 
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which keeps their current status. In this scheme, all of the proxy agents and their backup 
are situated in the proxy region. 
 
3.5.3 In the Leaf Region 
 
The leaf agents will not keep one or two backups of themselves. Therefore, if a leaf 
agent is not functioning, its responsible proxy agent will detect it. The proxy agent will 
then seek its buddy agent for the current location and status. Then it creates a new one. 
However, the attacker who disabled this leaf agent may still be in the leaf region and 
continuing to sniff the network traffic. If the attackers discover the resumed agent, he or 
she will disable it immediately. In this case, we have to repair the network to find out 
the intruders first to prevent further attacks. Therefore, we locate the backup agent on 
different hosts. 
 
3.6 Backing up critical agents 
  
From the above description, critical agents can only communicate with the leaf 
agents through proxy agents. To secure the critical region, we do not allow the 
connection initiated from other regions to the critical region, so that a proxy agent need 
not know the current location of the critical agents. Therefore, a connection between a 
critical agent and a proxy agent can only be initiated by the critical agent. After 
initialization, critical agent and proxy agent can start to transfer data or command when 
the connection is up.  
This applies for the connection between a proxy agent and a leaf agent being 
initiated only from a proxy agent. A leaf agent can report its request or current location 
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to group multicast address. Hence, it will not know its responsible proxy agent’s 
location until proxy agent connects it. This top-down security structure makes it very 
hard for the attacker to start an attack from the bottom level. Also the protection of the 
agents is also from top level to bottom level.  
In Figure 3-4, we can see that in the critical region, the critical agents can protect 
themselves by backup. They can also protect the group coordinator of C and C’. 
Furthermore, C and C’ can protect their group members (A and A’ respectively). The 
“buddy” agents in group G and G’ can protect each other. A and A’ will then protect the 
leaf agents they are responsible for.  
 
















3.7 Procedures of location update and 
update/downlink 
 
In this section, we will describe in detail the location update operation, the data 
flow (uplink) and command flow (downlink) procedures. 
 
3.7.1 Location updates of leaf agents 
 
Whenever a leaf agent changes its location, it must report its current location once 
to the multicast group G. Then the multicast group will receive these location update 
messages. The group coordinator C will forward these messages to its shadow C’ that 
will be responsible for the maintenance of location database. Lastly, C’ will distribute 
the location update information to the related agent in its group so that a part of the 
location database is stored in these agents.  
 
3.7.2 Location updates of proxy group G and G’ 
 
The coordinator C for multicast group G will be responsible for the location update 
and join/leave operation in its group. In short, C will maintain a secure group G. The 
coordinator C’ for group G’ is the shadow of C in group G. C’ maintain the location 
update message of all its members. Note that G’ is not a multicast group so the 
communication inside the group is a one to one connection secured by conventional 
methods. C and C’ may store their current location for each other and also report their 
location to the critical server.  
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3.7.3 Location updates of critical agents 
 
The critical agents will be managed by their critical server that not only stores their 
location update messages but also maintain the current location of C and C’. As 
mentioned before, the central directory server is replaced by several directory servers. 
They consist of critical agent server for the critical agents in the critical region, the 
proxy agents of group C’ as the location server for all leaf agents in the leaf regions and 
C and C’ for the two group of proxy agents. 
 
3.8 Procedures of uplink 
 
In this case, a leaf agent X wants to transfer some data to a critical agent Y. The 






















Figure 3-5: The data upload procedure 
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Step 1: A request for transferring data to critical agent is sent to the multicast group. 
Step 2: The responding agent (suppose A1 responsible for this request) receive this 
request, it will initiate a connection to the requesting agent and get the data. All other 
agents in this group except group coordinator will simply drop this multicast message. 
Step 3: The group coordinator C will initiate a connection to its shadow C’ and inform 
of this data request. The identification of the responding agent (A1) is included in the 
message. 
Step 4: The group coordinator C’ then informs A1’ (A1 “buddy”) that a data request is 
coming.  
Step 5: While A1’ receiving this information will initiate a connection to A1 and get 
data originated from leaf region.  
Step 6: C’ will then inform the critical agent about the request and A1 location. 














3.9 Procedures of downlink of command 
 
In this case, a critical agent wants to give a command to a leaf agent Y. The 




















Figure 3-6: The commands download procedure 
 
Step 1: The critical agent X first inform the coordinator C’ that it will send a command 
to a leaf agent and C’ selects a proxy agent A1 as the forwarding agent. 
Step 2: The critical agent will then connect to the proxy agent A1’. A1’ will receive 
this request. 
Step 3: A1’ initiate a connection to A1 (A1’ knows A1 current location). A1 get the 
command together with the leaf agent’s location. 
Step 4: A1 initiates a connection to the leaf agent Y and transfers the command to it. 
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3.10 Attack Analysis on our model 
 
We defined four kinds of attacks: the penetration attack (PA), the passive sniffing 
attack (SA), the active probing attacking (AP) and the denial of service attack (DoS). 
SA and AP are common attack techniques that gather information from local LAN 
before conducting PA or DoS attacks. Passive network sniffing is where an attacker 
listens to the network traffic passing by a host on which the attacker has control. Active 
probing is where a hacker maps out the hosts in a network by sending out packets to the 
IP addresses owned by an organization. Active probing can reveal hosts that are 
working, the operating systems they are running, the server applications running on 
these operating systems. The most popular software tool for active probing is Nmap. 
 
3.10.1 Attack on leaf region (leaf agents) 
 
The hosts in leaf region are penetrable. If a host is penetrated by the attacker, the 
attacker then use this host as the attacking point towards other hosts. For example, the 
attacker can use this host’s port to listen to the passing network packets and disable the 
whole LAN. Furthermore, the attackers can also use active probing to attack other hosts 
in the other LANs. If an attacker can penetrate many hosts undetected, we can clearly 
draw a conclusion that the IDS itself is not secure. In our approach, we proposed that 
the IDSs can still function and the attacker has not been successful in disrupting critical 
parts of the hosts.  
An attacker can also destroy the IDS agent worked on this host. He or she may even 
modify the agent’s code for malicious purposes. In this case, the backup mechanism for 
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the leaf agents can be used for resuming the ruined leaf agents. We can see from the last 
subsection that the attacker may get the location of a proxy agent during a connection. 
She or he will then launch an attack on the proxy region. 
 
3.10.2 Attack on proxy region (proxy agents) 
 
In our definition, we let the proxy agent change location after every operation with 
the leaf agent. If the attacker can still penetrate the host and he/she is fast enough, 
he/she still can control the host before the agent leaves the region. In this situation, the 
proxy agent in that multicast group will be in danger. The attacker will either disable the 
agents or wait in the host to sniff the network packets traffic. By doing this, the attacker 
will be able to determine the multicast group address and the proxy agent’s buddy 
location. In the worst condition, the attacker breaking the proxy region may further 
attack the critical region that if successful, may cause some of the critical agents to 
malfunction, by resurrected by their backups. The agents move randomly in the region 
so that it cannot detect the exact location except for SA and PA. If an attacker launches 
a successful flooding DoS attack against a critical host, all critical agents will 
seamlessly move to another critical host.   
In our assumption, the attacker will soon be detected before it launches another 
attack. The reason we can make such an assumption is because the hosts in proxy area 
are neither used as application clients nor as any important servers. Their tasks are 
simple enough so that it would be easy and straightforward to protect them. Also to 
detect the malicious status of these network elements may be very quick since they 
perform limited functions. We can at least protect the security of the proxy agent’s 
“buddy”. Attackers will then conduct a DoS attack if they cannot penetrate the critical 
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hosts. Occasionally, the attacker randomly targets a host and hopefully it can spot a 
critical host.  
Another method an attacker may use is traffic analysis. Since the attacker cannot 
sniff the other network segments, he or she can analyze the traffic of its penetrated 
segment. This segment may contain any one of these agents: the proxy agent, the buddy 
agent or none of the agents. For the proxy agent’s segment, this traffic analysis cannot 
help the attacker to find out the group coordinator because all of the multicast messages 
are through secure group communication. For the buddy agent’s segment, the attacker 
may find out the group coordinator since they communicate on a one to one scheme. If 
DoS attack is launched on the coordinator and cause it to shut down, its “buddy” agent 
may resume it by its knowledge.  
 
3.10.3 Attack on critical region (critical agents) 
 
With our proposed workable attack resistant properties, it is rather difficult for the 
attacker to penetrate the critical region. She or he also can not use sniffing or probing 
for some usable information since the critical agent does not reply on these random 
messages. The attacker may randomly select a critical host or get the IP address of some 
critical hosts by attacking the proxy agent and their buddies. He or she will also conduct 
DoS attack to them. The critical agents under such an attack will resurrect itself using its 
backup mechanism. This is to say that at least part of the IDSs system will not be 
completely down by such attack. If the IDSs can still function, system administrators 




3.11 Proposed Implementation Techniques 
 
1. In our proposed solution, we have assumed that the agent system is actually an 
authenticated system. All agents arriving at the hosts are authenticated by their unique 
identifications and all packets arriving at the agents must be source authenticated. For 
example, the IDS hosts that an agent tries to visit will authenticate the agents’ identities 
before they can host them successfully. A leaf agent may report its locations and send 
messages to a proxy agent. These agents who receive these packets must first 
authenticate their source. 
The authentication scheme is used all over this architecture. It can be used to check 
if the agents stay in their proper regions (critical agent must stay in critical region, proxy 
agent must stay in proxy region and leaf agent must stay in leaf region). It can also be 
used to check if the packets are transferred to or from the right agents (e.g. there should 
be no connection initiated from a leaf agent to proxy agent or from proxy agent to a 
critical agent). 
2. In our design, the proxy agents are formed inside a multicast group G. The 
main reason that we use multicast proxy group is to disseminate the central directory 
services to some distributed directory services. By this, we can ensure that the 
architecture has no central point of failure. With the backup scheme, we can quickly 
recover the ruined distributed directory services. The multicast group G is maintained 
by the group coordinator C. The responsibility of C is to ensure key refreshing at 
join/leave operations for securing the multicast group. 
3. There are several steps for a traditional IDS architecture deploying our 
proposed scheme. Firstly, since our solution is actually mobile agent based architecture; 
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the traditional IDS system must first install a mobile agent platform for all IDS hosts. 
Secondly, the mobile agent system must be a secure one so that a mobile agent system 
must be secure one so that a mobile agent platform can be well protected. Thirdly, all 
the IDS components are wrapped into the proper agents. We have analysis agents 
(critical agents) put into the critical region and data collection or IDSs sensor agents 
(leaf agents) put into the leaf region. Next we must build our proxy agents and the 
buddy agents and form them into groups. Further on, all the agent activities are 
restricted by many security rules propose in our scheme. 
As we did not change the IDS components from functioning unconventionally 
but instead we added in new features to enhance its robustness. We have wrapped them 
into agents and they are continued to detect intrusions and communicate with each other 
as usual. With all these assumptions proposed, we shall look into the provable attack 
properties.  
  
3.12 Provable attack resistant properties in 
our model 
 
This model has been designed to protect the critical IDS components of a 
traditional IDS hierarchy. In this section, we present proofs that describe the protections 
afforded critical IDS components. The main proof of this section is to claim that 
distributed IDS that follow the model are “attack resistant”. Definition of attack resistant: 
- critical host will not be easily penetrated or have its location discovered by an attacker, 
secondly no critical agents will be easily disabled by an attacker unless the attacker can 
disable the entire backbone network in that domain.  
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Theorem 1: For an IDS that follows the model, attackers will find difficulty to 
penetrate any critical or proxy host.  
Proof 1: The attacker can only attack the leaf region, the proxy region and the 
critical region. From the above analysis, in the bad situation, the attack to leaf region 
may cause some of the leaf IDSs agents to be down, but can be recovered soon by the 
proxy region. In the worse situation, if the attacker passes the leaf region, it can 
probably launch the attack to the proxy region that may cause some of the proxy agents 
to be down, but they can be resurrected by their “buddy” agents. The critical hosts 
communicate only with critical and proxy hosts. In the worst situation, the attacker 
breaking the proxy region may further attack the critical region and if successful, may 
cause some of the critical agents to malfunction, but they can be resurrected by their 
backups. If an attacker launches a successful flooding DoS attack against the critical 
host, all critical agents will seamlessly move to another critical host.  
Theorem 2: For an IDS that follows the model, attackers cannot easily discover 
the location of critical host. 
Proof 2: First we show that attackers cannot easily determine the location of a 
critical host by sniffing network traffic. All the critical and proxy hosts reside in 
backbone networks can only occur on the enterprise bus and the communication is 
encrypted. Therefore, it is unlikely for an attacker to discover the location of a critical 
host by using sniffing.  
Next, we show that attackers cannot determine the location of a critical host by 
active network probing. Critical hosts are installed only in the backbone networks and 
attackers can only control hosts in regions or the enterprise bus. If the scanning host lies 
about its location and pretends to be a backbone host, then the scanning host cannot see 
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the replies and thus cannot determine whether or not a backbone IDS host exists at the 


























Protecting Mobile Agent System 
 
4.1 Background of Mobile Agent System 
Security 
 
As our model employs mobile agents for protecting IDS components, these mobile 
agents may be the next target if attackers cannot effectively locate IDS critical 
components. Therefore, security is a fundamental concern for a mobile agent system. 
Harrison et. al5 identify security as a “severe concern” and regard it as the primary 
obstacle to adopting mobile agent systems. The security problem of mobile agent 


















Figure 4-1: Schematics of Agent System using Java  
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agents. A host node will run one or more agent server processes (see Figure 4-1), which 
facilitate the execution of visiting agents. Each agent server has an agent environment 
component, which acts as the interface between visiting agents and server. The server’s 
domain database keeps track of agents currently executing on it, and responds to status 
queries from their requestors. The agent transfer component implements a protocol that 
allows agents to migrate from server to server. A resource is an object that acts as an 
interface to some service or information available at the host. The server maintains a 
resource registry which is used in setting up safe bindings between resources and agents.   
Recently, Java has emerged as a widely used basis for building mobile agent 
systems because of its support for object-orientation, its security model for mobile code, 
and a rich set of libraries which support object serialization. The Aglet Workbench10 
developed by IBM is an example of a Java-based mobile agent system. It uses an event-
based programming model; handlers are defined for different types of events such as 
migration, dispatch, arrival at a server etc. The Java environment has a security aware 
design. Its security model has three main components: - a byte code verifier ensuring 
that programs do not violate type safety, a class loader objects are use to dynamically 
load classes into Java runtime, and security manager which can encode a security policy 
and perform some basic access control functions.   
 
4.1.1 Protection of Host Resource 
 
A host participating in a mobile system runs an agent server process. The host is 
exposed to various types of attacks, launched by malicious agents. These attacks can be 
categorized as: damage to host resources, denial of service to other agents etc. In order 
to prevent these attacks, we must protect the agent system by controlling the agent’s 
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access to system resource using security manager, wrapper38 etc. At the same time, 
legitimate agents must be given access to the resources they need. 
 
4.1.2 Protection of Agents 
 
 Many researches have been focused on some security issues of mobile agents, they 
have proposed framework of mobile agents called SOMA and Ajinta separately. These 
frameworks have similar functions and comprise of agent servers, management systems 
and security policies. In order to prevent malicious host’s tampering. Farmer and 
Swarup proposed an authentication mechanism43 to guarantee that the mobile agent only 
executes in a trust environment to prevent attacks. Some signature schemes30 have been 
proposed to protect mobile agents’ paradigm. In [41], two undetachable signature 
schemes are developed in RSA signature scheme and computed with encrypted 
functions. The undetachable signature scheme allows the mobile agent to sign a 
message without revealing the secret key.  
An agent acts as a delegate of its creator application and executes on behalf of its 
owner. Each agent carries a set of credentials which compose the agent’s identity and 
public key certificate. The creator may delegate to the agent only a limited set of 
privileges while working on its behalf. Such access restriction is encoded in the 
credentials. When a server receives an agent, it uses these credentials to validate the 
authenticity of the agent, and based on the agent’s identity and delegated rights, it can 




Based on Volker and Mehrdad’s scheme, they proposed a key management and 
access control mechanism. In their scheme, they constructed a mobile agent structure 
and designed a cryptographic key assignment mechanism to control the access of 
confidential data in a mobile agent. This provide a safe binding between the visiting 
agent code and the server resources, so that the agent can access the resources it needs 
but cannot breach system security by accessing the resources it is not authorized to use. 
However, their scheme is inefficient. It requires a larger agent size and higher 
computational cost. As we adopted mobile agent technology in IDS architecture, we 
need an efficient mechanism to protect the agent. Comparing with Volker and 
Mehrdad’s scheme, our scheme requires smaller amount of storage for the agent and 
lower computational cost for deriving the cryptographic keys. 
 
4.2 A Review of Volker and Mehrdad’s 
Scheme 
 
In 1998, Volker and Mehrdad constructed a structure for mobile agent and 
proposed a solution for access control and key management problems in a mobile agent 
by using cryptographic implementation approach. An efficient solution for controlling 
access in hostile environments is to encrypt the confidential data.   
 
4.2.1 Volker and Mehrdad’s Mobile Agent Structure 
 
The structure can support cryptographic encryption/decryption, agent access control, 
and key management for agents. Furthermore, the encryption/decryption mechanism 
and the digital signature mechanism can easily apply to the structure to ensure the 
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confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of the agent. Figure 4-2 illustrates mobile 
agent structure in a tree-based structure. The nodes of the structure might either be 
folders or files. The agent structure can be divided into two branches, the static branch 
and the dynamic branch. In static branch, the contents are all fixed data of the agent, 
such as class code, security policies. The features of these data are not changed during 
the life time of the agent. Whilst in the dynamic branch, the contents are variant data of 
the agent such as return results, access control keys. The branch contains a heap as a 














Figure 4-2: Volker and Mehrdad’s Mobile Agent Structure 
 
The agent structure can be efficient to achieve integrity protection and 
authentication by applying to a digital signature. The agent’s owner can use digital 
signature to sign the static part. Thus the integrity of the context in the static branch can 
be verified by the hosts that the mobile agent is visiting. If the verification is correct, the 
visited host can trust that the agent’s origination and its contents are not tampered. 
Additionally, when the agent has completed its tasks with a specific host, the return 
results are stored in the dynamic part. However, the previous collected data may be 
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modified by the malicious hosts. For keeping the integrity, the malicious host has to 
sign the root node.  
 
4.2.2 Volker and Mehrdad’s Key Management and  
Access Control Strategy 
 
In order to keep the confidentiality of the agent, Volker and Mehrdad has proposed 
a key management and access control strategy. The proposed strategy also can be done 
in the mobile agent structure efficiently. The objectives of their strategy are not only 
achieving the confidentiality of the security contents in both static and dynamic 
branches but also avoid malicious agents from accessing the secure contexts. Secondly, 
the access control keys are used to control the hosts’ access to mobile agent. By doing 
so, we can prevent spying from malicious hosts. In the following, we shall briefly 
describe the key management and access control strategy. 
First the agents use the symmetric cryptosystem to encrypt the all confidential files 
with enciphering keys EK = [EK1, EK2, …, EKJ]. In symmetric encryption, the ciphertext 
is produced using the enciphering keys. Upon decryption, the ciphertext can be 
transformed back to the original plaintext by using a decryption algorithm and the same 
key that was used for encryption. Then the agent owner creates a history folder HFi for 
each visited host VHi within the static/security context/access control folder. Each 
folder HFi contains the corresponding deciphering keys DKi according to the privileges 
of the visited host VHi. If a host possesses the privilege to access a confidential file, it 
can find the deciphering key in its corresponding folder. In order to avoid the 
unauthorized user disclosing the confidential folders, each folder HFi owned by the 
visited host VHi is encrypted by an available public key cryptosystem with the VHi 
public key EKi. Then, the encrypted results are placed into the static/security context/ 
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access control folder. Therefore, when the agent arrives at a host, the host can find out 
its corresponding folder from static/security context/access control and each host VHi 
only has the capability to access its corresponding folder by using its private key Dki. 
 In Figure 4-3, a simple example of key management and access control strategy. In 
this figure, we assume that the folder of classes containing four files, which are 
agent.zip, negotiate.zip, support.zip, and updates.zip. The file agent.zip is non-
confidential, but the other files are confidential and separately encrypted with the keys 
Ek1, Ek2, and Ek3. Furthermore, according to the privilege of the visited hosts, the agent 
owner creates three folders HF1, HF2, HF3 which are on behalf of the proxy host, critical 
host, and leaf host separately. If they possess the privilege to access the specific files in 
the host, the corresponding deciphering keys are copied into the folder and encrypted by 
the host’s public keys. For example, the folder HF1 contains the encrypted keys Ek1, Ek2, 
Ek3 and thus the proxy host can obtain the deciphering keys to access the files 
negotiate.zip, support.zip, and updates.zip. Similarly, the folder HF2 contains Ek2 and 
Ek3 and thus the critical host can access the files support.zip and updates.zip. The folder 
HF3 only contains K3 and thus the leaf host can only access negotiate.zip. Therefore, the 
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Figure 4-3: Volker and Mehrdad’s access control and key management strategy 
 
4.2.3 The Drawbacks of Volker and Mehrdad’s Scheme 
 
Volker and Mehrdad’s scheme is an efficient tree-based structure with a key 
management and access control strategy for the mobile agent. In their strategy, each 
folder HFi must hold and manage a set of subordinate keys. This arrangement raises the 
problems of large agent code and more public computations. It is better to make the size 
of the mobile agent small because a smaller mobile agent can conserve the network 
bandwidth. It is more easily delivered in the network. The followings are the 
drawbacks:- 
1. Large agent code. In this scheme, we find that the decryption key is repeated to 
store in different folders. For example, K1 can be found in both HF1 and HF3. 
The same thing goes for K2 and K3 too. It takes up too much space and 
increases the size of mobile agent.  
58 
2. More public key computation. Since decryption keys are repeated to store in the 
folder static/security context/access control list, the agent owner has to use 
more public key encryption computation to keep the folder secure, and the 
visited hosts also require more public key decryption computation to recover 
the decryption keys.  
 
4.3 Proposed RSA Key Assignment and 
Access Control Strategy 
 
Based on RSA public key cryptosystem2, our proposed scheme plans to solve the 
cryptographic key assignment problem in mobile agent environments. In the section, we 
first present our strategy including key generation phase and key derivation phase. Then 
we present the dynamic key management problem in mobile agents.  
 
4.3.1 The Proposed Scheme 
 
The proposed strategy for performing key generation phase and key derivation 
phase are stated as follows: 
 
Key Generation Phase 
Step 1: The agent owner (system administrators) randomly chooses two large primes, p 
and q. For maximum security, choose p and q of equal length. Next, the agent owner 
calculates n such that n=p x q, where n is public. 
Step 2: The agent owner chooses another parameter, g, which is relatively prime to n 
and in the range power of 2 less than n-1.  
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Step 3: The agent owner chooses a set of distinct primes {e1,e2…..,em} for all 
confidential files {F1,F2,…….Fm} where each ei has to relatively prime to φ (n), i.e 
gcd(φ (n), ei) = 1 and 1 < ei < φ (n), denotes the Euler’s totient function of n. 
Step 4: The agent owner calculates {d1,d2,…….dm}, where each di is the multiplicative 
inverse of ei, i.e ei x di  1 mod ≡ φ (n). The parameters {d1,d2,…….dm}are kept secret, 
but the parameters {e1,e2…..em} and n are published. 
Step 5: The agent owner calculates the enciphering keys Ek1, Ek2,….. Ekm for 
encrypting the confidential files F1, F2,……Fm separately. The enciphering keys can be 
calculated by the following equation 
Ek = gdi mod n                                  (1) 
Step 6: The agent owner generates the derivation keys {Dk1, Dk2………Dkm} for all 
visited hosts {VH1, VH2,……..VHm} as follows. 
Dkm = g∏ Fk<VH(dk) mod n                (2) 
for k = 1,2……,m where Fk < VHi means that the visited host VHi possesses a privilege 
to access the confidential file Fk. Next Eki is encrypted by using the public key 
cryptosystem VHi public key PKi. Therefore, the derivation key is kept secret. Only the 







Key Derivation Phase 
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Step 1: When an agent arrives at a host VHi, the host can find out its corresponding 
folder from static/security context/access control list and use its private key Dki to 
decrypt the contents in its folder HFi. 
Step 2: If the host keeps the relation Fm < VHi, the host VHi can derive the deciphering 
key Ki from its derivation key Dki as follows: 
Ki =   DKi Fk<VH, k∏ ≠ i(ek) mod n 
       =   g∏ Fk<VH(dk) ∏ Fk<VH, k≠ i(ek) mod n 




In Figure 4-4, each host folder HFi only contains a derivation key Dki instead of 
many subordinate keys. According to the access policies, VH1 possesses the greatest 
privileges. It can derive the three deciphering keys for encrypting the three confidential 
files. VH2 possesses the privileges to access the files updates.zip and negotiate.zip. Thus 
it can derive the corresponding deciphering keys Dk2 and Dk3. VH3 possesses the least 
privilege. It can only access the file support.zip. Thus the derivation key is the 




























Figure 4-4: Our proposed strategy 
 
 In Figure 4-5, it shows the example of key assignment in our strategy. Assume that 
the agent owner first chooses two prime p = 37 and q = 47, and computes n = p x q = 
1739. Then, the agent owner chooses a parameter g = 17 which is relatively primes e1 = 
5, e2 = 11, and e3 = 13, and computes their multiplicative inverses d1 = 1325, d2 = 1355, 
and d3 = 637. the enciphering keys Ek1, Ek2, and Ek3 for the confidential files F1, F2, F3 
can be computed from Equation (1), and thus K1 = 338, K2 = 1202, and K3 = 392. In 
addition, the agent owner also assigns the derivation keys to the visited hosts. Applying 
to the Equation (2), the derivation keys are computed as DK1 = 17 d1 x d2 x d3 mod 1739 = 
1606, DK2 = 17 d1 x d2 mod 1739 = 949 and DK3 = 17d1 mod1739 = 338. Let the 
parameters e1, e2, e3 and n public, and the other parameters p, q, Ek1, Ek2, Ek3, Dk1, Dk2 



















K3= 17637 mod 1739
 
Figure 4-5: Key assignment in our proposed strategy 
 
When the agent arrives at a host, the host can utilize its derivation key and the 
public parameters to calculate the deciphering key by means of the Equation (3). For 
example, VH1 can obtain the deciphering keys K1, K2, and K3, by calculating K1 = 
DK1e2xe3 mod 1739 =338, K2 = DK1e1xe3 mod 1739=1202. Furthermore, if the host does 






4.4 Dynamic Key Management 
 
In many cases the agent owner has to adapt the agent dynamically. As a result, the 
system should be flexible enough to handle the dynamic key management problems. 
The problems are involved in the addition and deletion of confidential files, granting 
and removal of access right to a visited host. In the following, these issues will be 
considered. 
 
4.4.1 Adding an access file 
 
In an existing mobile agent structure, a new confidential file Fk is added to the 
agent. The agent owner has to perform the following works: 
1. The agent owner establishes the access policies and chooses the parameter 
ek and dk for the confidential file Fk. 
2. The agent owner updates the derivation keys Dki for all the visited hosts 
VHi with the access right to the new file. The updated derivation key Dki 
can be calculated from the equation.  
Dki = Dkidk mod n                                (4) 
3. Store the secret parameter and publish the public parameter of Fk. Since 
the other public parameters and secret parameters are independent, they do 






4.4.2 Deleting an access file 
 
When a confidential file Fk should be deleted from the agent, the agent owner has to 
perform the works: 
1. Remove the confidential file from the agent. 
2. The agent updates the derivation keys Dki for all the visited hosts VHi with 
the access right to the deleted file. The updated derivation key Dki can be 
calculated from the equation 
Dki = Dkiek mod n                               (5) 
Similar to the addition of an access file, the other parameters do not need to be changed. 
 
4.4.3 Granting an access right 
 
When the agent grants a new access relationship Fk<VHi to the VHi, the agent will 
only updates VHi derivation key DKi. The updated derivation key DKi can be calculated 
from the Equation (4). The other parameters also do not need to be changed. 
 
4.4.4 Removing an access right 
 
When the agent removes the access relationship Fk<VHi the agent requires to 






4.5 Security and Performance Analysis 
 
We shall examine the security of our proposed key assignment and access control 
scheme in section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2. In addition, we shall also discuss the required storage 
and computational cost in our proposed scheme. 
 
4.5.1 Cryptanalysis against RSA Security 
 
Our proposed strategy is based on RSA cryptosystem. The security is similar to that 
of the RSA cryptosystem; it is based on the problem of factoring large number. 
Factoring n is the most obvious means of attack. However, without knowing the two 
large primes p and q, it is difficult to obtain the multiplicative inverse di from the public 
parameters ei and the modular n. Any adversary who wants to derive the multiplicative 
inverse di has to first factorize n into its two prime factors.  
It is certainly possible for a cryptanalyst to try every possible di until (s)/he 
stumbles on the correct one. Most discussion of the cryptanalysis of RSA have focused 
on the task of factoring n into its 2 prime factors. Determining φ  (n) given n is 
equivalent to factoring n. With presently known algorithm, determining d given ei and n 
appears to be at least as time consuming as the factoring problem.  
For a large n with large prime factors, factoring is a hard problem, but not as hard 
as it used to be now. The threat to larger key sized is 2 fold with the continuing increase 
in computing power, and the continuing refinement of factoring algorithm. We can 
expect further refinement of generalized number field sieve (GNFS), and use of an even 
better algorithm is also possibility. 
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Thus, we need to be careful in choosing a key size for RSA. For the near future, a 
key size in the range of 1024 to 2048 bits seems reasonable. In addition to specify the 
size of n, a number of other constraints have been suggested by researchers. To avoid 
values of n that may be factored more easily. The algorithm researchers26 suggest the 
following constraints on p and q:-  
(1) p and q should differ in length by only a few digits. Thus, for a 1024 bits 
key (309 decimal digits); both p and q should be on the order of 
magnitude 1075 to 10100. 
(2) Both (p-1) and (q-1) should contain a large prime factor. 
(3) gcd (p-1, q-1) should be small. In addition, it has demonstrated that if e<n 
and d<n1/4, and d can be easily determined.    
 
4.5.2 Preventing unauthorized hosts from accessing 
 
Without the privileges to access the confidential file Fi, the visited host VHi cannot 
derive the deciphering keys Ki. Since the multiplicative inverse di is not embedded in 
the derivation key Dki, Dki will reveal no information of Fi. Therefore, the malicious 
hosts have no way to derive the deciphering key from the derivation key and the public 
parameters. In the other hand, if an unauthorized host wants to derive the deciphering 
key Ki = gdi mod n from the public parameters ei and n, the problem is similar to 






4.5.3 Performance Analysis 
 
In Volker and Mehrdad’s scheme, it requires a larger agent size and a higher 
computational cost. In the scheme, the deciphering keys are stored repeatedly in the 
agent. Thus, a large agent size is required in their scheme especially when the agent 
carries large confidential files. This phenomenon raises a problem that the agent 
occupies more network bandwidth when it roams over the backbone. In order to reduce 
the overhead, we have to reduce the size of the mobile agent.  
Assuming that a mobile agent will visit j hosts in the IDS network 
VH1,VH2……VHj and carry m confidential files F1,F2……..Fm. Let the number of the 
files that the visited hosts are allowed to access are T1, T2………Tr. Consequently, let 
the length of the keys to range between 1 to n-1 in the used symmetric and public key 
cryptosystems. Therefore, Volker scheme requires to store ∑i=1 to rTi deciphering keys in 
their corresponding folders and the total storage space of these deciphering keys is n x 
(∑i=1 to rTi). However, only r derivation keys and m public parameters are required to 
store in our scheme. From the key generation phase, the public parameters and 
derivation keys are all between 1 to n-1. Thus only n x (r + m) memory space is 
required in our scheme.  
On other aspect, how to reduce the computational cost is also an important issue. In 
Volker and Mehrdad’s scheme, each host’s folder in static/security context/access 
control list must be kept secret to avoid unauthorized host disclosing. Thus, each folder 
needs to be encrypted by using the public key cryptosystems. Since the plaintext length 
must be smaller or the same as the length of the public key, Volker and Mehrdad’s 
scheme requires (∑i=1 to rTi) exponential computation to decrypt the deciphering keys. In 
total, (2 x ∑i=1 to rTi) exponential computations are required in Volker and Mehrdad’s 
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scheme. However, our scheme only requires r exponential computations to encrypt the 
derivation keys, r exponential computations to decrypt the derivation keys and (∑i=1 to rTi) 
exponential computations to derive the deciphering keys. Such that only 2r + (∑i=1 to rTi) 




























Information has become critical to the success of business. Many businesses are built on 
information including software companies, brokerages, and advertising and marketing 
companies. Information may be more fragile than physical assets – it is more easily lost, 
destroyed, and stolen. With the emergence of distributed network environment, 
organization’s critical information assets travel around the world on networks and in 
portable computers creating new challenges to the security of information.  
In our model, it resists flooding DoS attacks using passive response system. Instead 
of trying to actively trying to stop an attacker’s actions, our IDS model attempts to hide 
IDS components and move them away from harm. Thus our IDS components become 
invisible to an attacker’s normal means of seeing in a network; passive sniffing, active 
network monitoring. The main functions of our proposed architecture are hiding critical 
IDSs agents and dissemination of central directory services. The success of these two 
functions will effectively protect critical IDS components. Despite the above mentioned, 
we make extensive use of mobile agent technology. This technology is crucial to the 
architecture because it provides backup capability for critical agents. Furthermore, this 
technology can allow critical components to randomly move around hosts.  
 Although many people avoid mobile agent technology because of its security trusts. 
This common perception has arisen because many people want to use mobile agents in 
E-commerce that do no necessarily trust each other. However, one can implement a 
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secure mobile agent application by creating a “closed” mobile system. In a “closed” 
environment, all resource accesses would have to be checked by the security manager in 
the agent server. However, there are a few disadvantages. Because all security policies 
would have to be enforced through it, the security manager may tend to become an 
excessively large module and that could raise the potential for introducing errors during 
extensions. Therefore, our approach is to implement a public key cryptosystem to 
authenticate agents involved. 
 Despite these advantages and provable characteristics, our model is not 
completely secure. As it is impossible to build a completely secure system but at least it 
proves to be one effective method available for thwarting DoS attacks. 
 In conclusion, we envision IDSs of the future playing an increasingly 
prominent role in securing organizations’ networks, both from the detection and 
response arena. Due to this, attackers will attempt to disable IDSs before penetrating 
and tapping more valuable resources. 
 
5.2 Future Works 
 
One difficulty for theoretical research in defending intrusion detection system has 
been the lack of proper models for the design. Most of the past research has been 
focused on the developments of intrusion detection system and how effective intrusion 
can be detected. In most existing intrusion detection work these decisions have been 
made implicitly by the designers. 
In my research, I have started working on developing a model that will serve as a 
defensive system for intrusion detection system. This model represents how a defensive 
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system are conceptually designed, implemented, deployed and used. There are two basic 
problems that we have to address in the future. The first is to design protocols for 
constructing credentials (enhanced Volker and Mehrdad’s scheme) for an agent to act as 
its owners. Secondly, we will have to build a proxy mechanism in the proxy region. In 
this approach, this can be used to control binding between agents co-located at a proxy 
host, allowing them to securely communicate with agents in the leaf regions. And the 
proxy serving as a capability and its propagation can be restricted by encapsulating 
within it the identity of the agent to whom it was granted. We will also implement 
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